Entrepreneurship & Strategy

Airbnb vs. Wimdu: Turning Down an Acquisition and Choosing to Expand

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Book excerpt (Reid Hoffman and Chris Yeh, Blitzscaling)

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Collected in Robin Shen’s Field Notes · Content type and attribution are shown above

English version published 2026-11-08 with AI assistance. Attribution, source notes, and verification limits are retained in the text. 中文原文

Reading guide

Facing competition from Wimdu and an offer to merge in exchange for equity, Airbnb chose to expand on its own. This book excerpt explores the tradeoffs among speed, culture-integration risk, and where to put resources. The quotes and figures are kept at the level of the book's own narrative.

Key points

  • An acquisition isn't just about price; it also brings culture and integration risk
  • Competitive pressure pushed the team to speed up international expansion
  • Nights booked are not the same as bookings, and announcement dates don't show the order deals closed
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Full text — English translation

Fact-check notes (2026-11-02): This is an excerpt of a case from Blitzscaling by Reid Hoffman and Chris Yeh; "the author" in the first person refers to Hoffman. The figures of 40 and 400 employees and the 25% equity offer come from the book's narrative; no independent personnel or deal records were obtained. Airbnb's official announcements at the time counted nights booked. The English edition itself uses "bookings" in this passage, so this isn't just a Chinese translation issue. The 1 million and 10 million milestones here are presented as nights booked, per contemporaneous sources, not as number of bookings. The Accoleo acquisition was reported on June 1, 2011, and Airbnb's official Series B release is dated July 25. The June report also mentioned the funding news, so the two announcement dates can't prove the actual order of closing or how the money was used. The relevant passages were checked against the English edition; the whole book was not read. The quotes below are rendered from the Chinese and have not been matched word for word to the English edition. Sources: https://assets.airbnb.com/press/press-releases/Airbnb_PressRelease_SeriesB_07252011.pdf https://assets.airbnb.com/press/press-releases/Airbnb_1M_Nights_Booked_Print.pdf https://techcrunch.com/2012/06/19/airbnb-10-million-bookings-global/ https://techcrunch.com/2011/06/01/airbnb-buys-german-clone-accoleo-opens-first-european-office-in-hamburg/ ---- #Blitzscaling #AirbnbsBigEarlyDecision In 2011, Airbnb was still a scrappy little startup with just 40 employees. Co-founder and CEO Brian Chesky had a big decision to make. Wimdu, a German copycat, wanted to merge into Airbnb in exchange for 25% of Airbnb's equity. Airbnb made it easy for people to rent out a room or their home for others to stay the night. At first, every investor the founders approached turned them down or simply ignored them. Now the company was taking off, but those painful early days were still fresh in their minds, and they didn't want to fight another war on a new front. When Paul Graham, founder of Y Combinator, the world's top accelerator, first heard the Airbnb idea, he bluntly told them it was terrible. "People are actually doing this?!" he asked skeptically. Brian told him yes, people really were renting out their living space for strangers to stay the night. Graham's response: "What's wrong with them?" Even so, Graham accepted Airbnb into YC's three-month program. It wasn't because the idea won him over. It was because the founders' hustle impressed him. He loved the cereal story: how Brian and his co-founders scraped together money to keep Airbnb alive by selling novelty breakfast cereal. The creativity and grit the team showed earned them a spot in YC. Once in, they refined the business and convinced two leading venture firms, Sequoia Capital and Greylock Partners, to invest. Four years later, all that work finally seemed to be paying off. Airbnb had passed 1 million nights booked and had plenty of operating capital. Clearly the idea, and the persistence behind it, were worth a lot. But success attracts competition. Sometimes that competition is an existential threat. For Airbnb, the threat came from three brothers in Cologne, Germany: Marc, Oliver, and Alexander Samwer. They studied U.S. startups that were starting to take off and quickly launched copycats of the same kind in Europe. Most of the time they sold these clones to the American companies that came up with the original idea, and became billionaires doing it. The Samwers' first big hit was Alando, an eBay clone they sold to eBay for $43 million just 100 days after launch. They went on to back German versions of YouTube (MyVideo), Twitter (Frazr), and Facebook (StudiVZ), then built their own startup studio, Rocket Internet. In early 2011, Airbnb users started getting promotional emails from a startup called Wimdu. Wimdu had just raised $90 million, the largest investment in a European startup up to that point, from Rocket Internet and Kinnevik, a big Swedish investment firm that partnered with the Samwers. Wimdu's business model and website looked like an Airbnb knockoff. Wimdu launched in March 2011. Within weeks, the Berlin-based company had hired as many as 400 people and opened 20 offices across Europe. Meanwhile Airbnb, the much smaller original, had raised only $7 million, had 40 employees, and operated out of a single office in San Francisco. Brian, a first-time CEO, wasn't even sure how to open a second office, let alone dozens on another continent. Brian's assessment was that if Wimdu captured and dominated Europe, Airbnb might not survive. As he put it, "If you're a travel site and you're not in Europe, you're done." The Samwers had named their price: Airbnb could acquire Wimdu for 25% of its equity. Brian faced a tough call, and either choice was a headache. He reached out to the best experts he could find. His first call was to Andrew Mason, then CEO of Groupon. The well-known group-buying company had been through something similar the year before. In December 2009, the Samwers launched their Groupon clone, CityDeal. Six months later, Groupon acquired the rival for a nine-figure sum, roughly 10% of Groupon's valuation at the time. The question weighed heavily on Brian and his team: should Airbnb follow Groupon's playbook and buy the copycat? Brian's gut said no. Absorbing Wimdu's finance-focused, metrics-driven team could wreck Airbnb's design-driven culture. He also didn't want to reward what he saw as legalized extortion rather than genuine value creation. But Mason also told him that, although acquiring CityDeal created plenty of problems, it sped up Groupon's push into Europe, and Europe eventually accounted for 30% of Groupon's global sales. In hindsight, buying CityDeal for 10% of Groupon was actually a great deal. This time, though, the Samwers wanted a bigger share of Airbnb: 25%. Airbnb could reject the offer and take on the ambitious Samwers head-on. But Wimdu had home-field advantage in Europe and a first-mover advantage there, 10 times as many employees, and more than 10 times as much funding. Competing with them would be a hard fight. Brian was worn out by the grueling fundraising process, especially the mental strain, and he doubted he had it in him to take on what could be a brutal new battle. But before YC, he and his team had already spent 18 months on Airbnb with little to show for it, plus tens of thousands of dollars in credit card debt. After pouring so much blood, sweat, and tears into the company, were they really willing to give up a quarter of it? In the end, Brian decided not to buy Wimdu, partly on the advice of key advisers. Mark Zuckerberg told him to fight. "Don't buy them," Zuckerberg said. "The best product will win." Paul Graham said much the same: "They're mercenaries, and you're missionaries." And: "They're like parents who have kids but don't love them." When Brian asked the author for advice, the author also told him not to buy Wimdu. The key issue wasn't the price or the dilution. It was that this kind of deal could get in the way of the company's speed and success. "Buying Wimdu adds a lot of integration risk. Groupon got bogged down after it bought CityDeal." The author told him: "Merging cultures and management can be fatally risky, especially when it slows the company down. With Airbnb, we already benefit from network effects. We can win." In the end, Airbnb's founders realized they wanted to take on the Samwers. They wanted to win. But how? The key was an aggressive, all-out growth plan, what the author calls blitzscaling. Blitzscaling drives "lightning-fast" growth by prioritizing speed over efficiency, even in the face of uncertainty. It's a specific set of strategies and techniques, and it let Airbnb beat the Samwers. Brian was determined to get the resources he needed to outscale the Samwers. Just a few months later, he raised another $112 million in venture capital. Airbnb then launched an aggressive international expansion, including buying Accoleo, a smaller and cheaper German Airbnb clone, so Airbnb could compete with Wimdu directly on its home turf. By spring 2012, Airbnb had opened nine international offices, in London, Hamburg, Berlin, Paris, Milan, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Moscow, and São Paulo. In June 2012, Airbnb announced it had passed 10 million nights booked. "The Samwer brothers gave us a gift," Brian said years later in the author's blitzscaling class. "They forced us to scale faster than we ever had." By choosing to grow at breakneck speed, Airbnb came to dominate the market. Berlin-based Wimdu started with advantages in people, capital, and knowledge of the European market, but Brian's focus and persistence let Airbnb take the challenge head-on and ultimately beat the challenger. #Blitzscaling

These articles are personal notes, book excerpts, and collected reprints. Figures and events reflect the time of the original publication, are not current information, and do not constitute investment advice.

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